
**Information security, cybersecurity
and privacy protection — Evaluation
criteria for IT security —**

**Part 3:
Security assurance components**

*Sécurité de l'information, cybersécurité et protection de la vie
privée — Critères d'évaluation pour la sécurité des technologies de
l'information —*

Partie 3: Composants d'assurance de sécurité





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Foreword

ISO (the International Organization for Standardization) and IEC (the International Electrotechnical Commission) form the specialized system for worldwide standardization. National bodies that are members of ISO or IEC participate in the development of International Standards through technical committees established by the respective organization to deal with particular fields of technical activity. ISO and IEC technical committees collaborate in fields of mutual interest. Other international organizations, governmental and non-governmental, in liaison with ISO and IEC, also take part in the work.

The procedures used to develop this document and those intended for its further maintenance are described in the ISO/IEC Directives, Part 1. In particular, the different approval criteria needed for the different types of document should be noted. This document was drafted in accordance with the editorial rules of the ISO/IEC Directives, Part 2 (see www.iso.org/directives or www.iec.ch/members_experts/refdocs).

Attention is drawn to the possibility that some of the elements of this document may be the subject of patent rights. ISO and IEC shall not be held responsible for identifying any or all such patent rights. Details of any patent rights identified during the development of the document will be in the Introduction and/or on the ISO list of patent declarations received (see www.iso.org/patents) or the IEC list of patent declarations received (see <https://patents.iec.ch>).

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For an explanation of the voluntary nature of standards, the meaning of ISO specific terms and expressions related to conformity assessment, as well as information about ISO's adherence to the World Trade Organization (WTO) principles in the Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) see www.iso.org/iso/foreword.html. In the IEC, see www.iec.ch/understanding-standards.

This document was prepared by Joint Technical Committee ISO/IEC JTC 1, *Information technology*, Subcommittee SC 27, *Information security, cybersecurity and privacy protection*.

This fourth edition cancels and replaces the third edition (ISO/IEC 15408-3:2008), which has been technically revised.

The main changes are as follows:

- the terminology has been reviewed and updated;
- the exact conformance type has been incorporated;
- low assurance PPs have been removed and direct rationale PPs have been incorporated;
- PP-Modules and PP-Configurations for modular evaluations have been incorporated;
- multi-assurance evaluation has been incorporated.

A list of all parts in the ISO/IEC 15408 series can be found on the ISO website.

Any feedback or questions on this document should be directed to the user's national standards body. A complete listing of these bodies can be found at www.iso.org/members.html and www.iec.ch/national-committees.

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Republic of Korea	National Security Research Institute
Spain	Ministerio de Asuntos Económicos y Transformación Digital
Sweden	FMV, Swedish Defence Materiel Administration
United Kingdom	National Cyber Security Centre
United States	The National Security Agency

Introduction

Security assurance components, as defined in this document, are the basis for the security assurance requirements expressed in a Security Assurance Package, Protection Profile (PP), a PP-Module, a PP-Configuration, or a Security Target (ST).

These requirements establish a standard way of expressing the assurance requirements for TOEs. This document catalogues the set of assurance components, families and classes. It also defines evaluation criteria for PPs, PP-Configurations, PP-Modules, and STs.

The audience for this document includes consumers, developers, technical working groups, evaluators of secure IT products and others. ISO/IEC 15408-1:2022, Clause 5 provides additional information on the target audience of the ISO/IEC 15408 series, and on the use of the ISO/IEC 15408 series by the groups that comprise the target audience. These groups may use this document as follows:

- a) Consumers, who use this document when selecting components to express assurance requirements to satisfy the security objectives expressed in a PP or ST, determining required levels of security assurance of the TOE.
- b) Developers, who respond to actual or perceived consumer security requirements in constructing a TOE, reference this document when interpreting statements of assurance requirements and determining assurance approaches of TOEs.
- c) Evaluators, who use the assurance requirements defined in this document as a mandatory statement of evaluation criteria when determining the assurance of TOEs and when evaluating PPs and STs.

NOTE This document uses bold and italic type in some cases to distinguish terms from the rest of the text. The relationship between components within a family is highlighted using a bolding convention. This convention calls for the use of bold type for all new requirements. For hierarchical components, requirements are presented in bold type when they are enhanced or modified beyond the requirements of the previous component. In addition, any new or enhanced permitted operations beyond the previous component are also highlighted using bold type.

The use of italics indicates text that has a precise meaning. For security assurance requirements the convention is for special verbs relating to evaluation.

Information security, cybersecurity and privacy protection — Evaluation criteria for IT security —

Part 3: Security assurance components

1 Scope

This document defines the assurance requirements of the ISO/IEC 15408 series. It includes the individual assurance components from which the evaluation assurance levels and other packages contained in ISO/IEC 15408-5 are composed, and the criteria for evaluation of Protection Profiles (PPs), PP-Configurations, PP-Modules, and Security Targets (STs).

2 Normative references

The following documents are referred to in the text in such a way that some or all of their content constitutes requirements of this document. For dated references, only the edition cited applies. For undated references, the latest edition of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies.

ISO/IEC 15408-1:2022, *Information security — Evaluation criteria for IT security — Part 1: Introduction and general model*

ISO/IEC 15408-2, *Information security — Evaluation criteria for IT security — Part 2: Security functional components*

ISO/IEC 15408-4, *Information security, cybersecurity and privacy protection — Evaluation criteria for IT security — Part 4: Framework for the specification of evaluation methods and activities*

ISO/IEC 15408-5, *Information security — Evaluation criteria for IT security — Part 5: Pre-defined packages of security requirements*

ISO/IEC 18045:2022, *Information security, cybersecurity and privacy protection — Evaluation criteria for IT security — Methodology for IT security evaluation*

ISO/IEC IEEE 24765, *Systems and software engineering — Vocabulary*